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 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 




JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Craig Devlin appeals from the revocation of his supervised release and the 
imposition of a term of imprisonment and further period of supervised release.  His 
attorney has moved to withdraw as counsel, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  Because there are no nonfrivolous issues to 
appeal, we will grant the motion to withdraw and will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In 2011, Devlin pled guilty in the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland to conspiring to distribute and to possess heroin with intent to distribute.  He 
was sentenced to 70 months in prison, followed by a 4-year term of supervised release.  
In March of 2018, the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania accepted jurisdiction over Devlin’s supervised release.  Soon after, he was 
in trouble: he used illegal drugs, failed to submit to drug testing, and lied to his probation 
officer.  He admitted to those violations and was subsequently sentenced to 6 months 
imprisonment and a further term of supervised release of 24 months. 
Devlin completed his term of imprisonment without incident.  But, once outside of 
prison, he again violated the terms of his supervised release.  He failed to report to the 
probation office within 72 hours of his release from custody, and he subsequently tested 
positive for using drugs.  A couple of months later, he once again failed to report to the 
probation office and failed to inform them of a change in his employment status.  The 
probation office accordingly petitioned the District Court for a bench warrant.  [App. at 
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39.]  Instead, the Court issued a summons.  When Devlin failed to appear in court on 
March 1, 2019, a warrant was issued for his arrest.  In addition to the other violations 
cited in the summons, on March 26 2019, before appearing in court, Devlin admitted to 
recent drug use, which was confirmed by a drug test.   
Appearing before the District Court, Devlin confirmed that he understood the 
charges against him and that he was entitled to a hearing on them.  He then waived his 
right to a full hearing.  He admitted to Grade C violations of the terms of his supervised 
release and requested a sentence of 8 months in prison with no subsequent period of 
supervision.  The Court correctly identified the imprisonment range under the Sentencing 
Guidelines as 6 to 12 months.  The Court imposed the 8-month sentence of imprisonment 
that Devlin asked for but also imposed 12 months of supervised release, with 90 days of 
that period to be served in a halfway house.  The Court reasoned that the additional 
period of supervised release was necessary in light of Devlin’s repeated relapses and 
struggle with drug addiction.   
Devlin now appeals. 
II. DISCUSSION1 
Counsel may seek to withdraw from the representation of a criminal defendant 
when there are no nonfrivolous issues to appeal.  Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.  When counsel 
thus invokes Anders we first determine whether the requirements of our Local Appellate 
                                              
1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  The 




Rule 109.2(a) have been fulfilled.2  Second, we examine “whether an independent review 
of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.”3  United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 
300 (3d Cir. 2001).  “We exercise plenary review to determine whether there are any 
such issues.”  Simon v. Gov’t of the V.I., 679 F.3d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Penson 
v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80-83 & n.6 (1988)).  And when an Anders brief is adequate on its 
face, our review of the record is guided by the brief itself.  United States v. Coleman, 575 
F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2009).   
     The Anders Brief Is Adequate  
The first step of our review reveals that counsel’s Anders brief contains an 
adequate examination of the record and of issues that arguably might support an appeal.  
                                              
2 The Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a) states: 
 
Where, upon review of the district court record, counsel is persuaded that 
the appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit, counsel may file a 
motion to withdraw and supporting brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 
386 U.S. 738 (1967), which must be served upon the appellant and the 
United States.  The United States must file a brief in response.  Appellant 
may also file a brief in response pro se.  After all briefs have been filed, the 
clerk will refer the case to a merits panel.  If the panel agrees that the appeal 
is without merit, it will grant counsel’s Anders motion, and dispose of the 
appeal without appointing new counsel.  If the panel finds arguable merit to 
the appeal, or that the Anders brief is inadequate to assist the court in its 
review, it will appoint substitute counsel, order supplemental briefing and 
restore the case to the calendar.  The panel will also determine whether to 
continue the appointment of current counsel or to direct the clerk to 
discharge current counsel and appoint new counsel. 
 
3 Whether an issue is frivolous is a question informed by the standard of review 
for each potential claim raised.  See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 974-76 (7th 




Counsel represents that he has reviewed Devlin’s case, and that he has not been able to 
identify any viable issues to appeal.  Specifically, he concludes that 1) the District Court 
had jurisdiction; 2) Devlin’s waiver of a hearing and admissions relating to the 
supervised release violations were valid and voluntary; and 3) the sentence imposed by 
the District Court was both legal and reasonable.  Our independent review of the record 
confirms each of those conclusions. 
     Our Independent Review Reveals No Nonfrivolous Issues 
None of the potential issues identified by counsel has any merit, and Devlin has 
declined to file a pro se brief.   
1. The District Court Had Jurisdiction 
The District Court had the authority to terminate, extend, or revoke Devlin’s term 
of supervised release.  18 U.S.C § 3583(e)(1)-(3).  No one disputes, or reasonably could 
dispute, that the Court had subject matter jurisdiction.  As for personal jurisdiction, 
although Devlin was originally convicted in Maryland, the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania accepted jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3605.  The Court thus properly 
exercised jurisdiction over Devlin. 
2. Devlin’s Admissions Were Voluntary 
When revoking a defendant’s supervised release, a district court must ordinarily 
find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated the terms of his 
release.  Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000).  But when a defendant 
admits to the charged violations, the court’s duty is simply to ensure that the admission 
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was counseled and voluntary.  United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989).  And 
here, there is no basis to conclude that it was not. 
Devlin was represented by counsel at the hearing.  His lawyer at the time 
represented to the Court that she had explained to him his right to a full revocation 
hearing.  The Court also addressed Devlin to make sure he understood his rights and the 
accusations against him.  Devlin responded that he wished to admit to the Grade C 
violations for which he was ultimately sentenced.  His admission was accordingly both 
counseled and voluntary.  
3. The Sentence Imposed by the Court Was Reasonable 
To determine whether a sentence is reasonable, we examine “whether the record 
as a whole reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a).”  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007).  If the 
record demonstrates that the District Court did consider those factors, we then examine 
whether the Court reasonably applied them.  United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 543 
(3d Cir. 2007).  In the present record, there is nothing to suggest that the District Court’s 
sentence was unreasonable. 
Both Devlin and the Government agreed that the relevant guidelines range was 6 
to 12 months.  And the Court ultimately imposed the 8-month sentence that Devlin 
himself requested.  The only contested portions of the sentence are the further 12-month 
term of supervised release and the 90-day period in a halfway house.  The District Court 
had the authority to impose both conditions, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), (h), and it gave 
reasoned consideration to the relevant factors in imposing the sentence.  The Court was 
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specifically concerned that Devlin “suffer[ed] from a long term addiction problem” and 
that, “because of the dangers of continued drug use,” it was necessary to have “an 
additional term of supervision[.]”  (App. at 47.)  The sentence the Court imposed was 
clearly reasonable, both procedurally and substantively.  
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm 
the judgment of the District Court.  
